



## Prescribed mental attitudes in goal-adoption and norm-adoption

CRISTIANO CASTELFRANCHI

*National Research Council – Institute of Psychology\**

**Abstract.** The general aim of this work is to show the importance of the addressee's mind as planned by the author of a speech act or of a norm; in particular, how important are the expected motivations for goal adoption. We show that speech acts differ from one another for the different motivations the speaker is attempting to obtain from the hearer. The description of the participants' social positions is not sufficient. Important conflicts can arise which are not relative to what to do, but to the different motives requested by the speaker. This view is applied to norms, pointing out that what is required by a norm is not only a behaviour but also a mental attitude, and that the prescribed mind might be even more important than the prescribed behaviour. Norms don't want just behavioural conformity, but also that this conformity implies an acknowledgement and a reinforcement of both the authority and the norm itself. Norms ask for submission. Any form of norm is aimed at influencing the addressee by changing his or her mind.

### 1. Introduction

In Pragmatics a traditional criticism to speech act theory has been that it considers only the point of view of the speaker, and just represents the speaker's mind, i.e., the latter's intentions, beliefs, plans. Pragmatics worked to provide a more cooperative and constructive view of linguistic interaction and also of speech acts, by taking into account the hearer's initiative and understanding (Levinson, 1981; Trognon & Brassac, 1993; Brassac, 1994).

In the following we will partially support this criticism, claiming that the mind of the addressee has been insufficiently analysed in speech act theory, while it plays a very important role. However, we will argue this in quite a paradoxical way: by showing that the representation of the hearer's mind in the speaker's mind and plan is much richer and important than supposed before, and that speech acts differ from one another as for the different mental attitudes the speaker is attempting to obtain from the hearer.

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Moreover, the hearer negotiates with the speaker not only about the conveyed meaning, the conversational turn and rules, and the speaker's request (of doing or believing something), she negotiates also about the required-expected mental attitude, the adoption of some motivation to do. Important conflicts arise not about what to do, or about the decision to do or not to do, but about the different motivations for doing which are expected/requested by the speaker (or the norm "legislator"), and those that are offered by the hearer (or the norm addressee).

We apply this view to norms and in particular to normative prescriptions arguing that *what is required by a norm is not only a behaviour but also a mental and social attitude*, and that the prescribed mind (in particular the motivation) is more important than the prescribed behaviour.

As a consequence, any form of norm under any circumstance is aimed at influencing the addressee, i.e., at changing her goals.

## 2. Speech acts as planning for goal-adoption

Goal/plan-based analysis of speech acts (Cohen & Perrault, 1979; Allen & Perrault, 1980; Castelfranchi & Parisi, 1980; Parisi & Castelfranchi, 1976, 1981) claims that a speech act is a plan or an action aimed at inducing a given act in the addressee, through the knowledge of the speaker's intention.

More precisely, since the addressee is a Cognitive Agent who acts just on the basis of goals, speech acts are aimed at influencing the addressee, making her acquire a new goal (possibly an intention) that will finally determine her behaviour; this goal is the goal of the speaker. In this perspective – which is somewhat simplistic<sup>1</sup> – the plan of a speech act is based on social goal-adoption (Castelfranchi & Parisi, 1980).

There is social Goal-Adoption (Conte & Castelfranchi, 1995) when *an agent adopts a goal because and until (he believes that) it is a goal of another agent*. Or better (since this definition could cover also some form of imitation), *the agent has the goal that the other agent achieves/satisfies her goal* (Conte & Castelfranchi, 1995).

There are several form of Goal-Adoption (G-A), based on the different motives for adopting. We can distinguish between:

- **terminal G-A** (altruism, love, friendship, pity, etc.);
- **instrumental G-A** in which the adopting agent plans for some reward or reciprocation (ex. social and economic exchange);
- **cooperative G-A**: where y adopts x's goal because they have a common goal: so y is co-interested in x's achievement.

<sup>1</sup> This generalisation is in fact too strong. There are speech acts, like advices or insults, that are not aimed at the hearer's goal adoption (Castelfranchi, 1992) (see later).

Conte and Castelfranchi (1995) compare also forms and motives of G-A with forms and motives for Norm-Adoption (conforming to a Norm). We can comply with a norm either for terminal reasons (as an end in itself: to respect norms), or for an instrumental motivation (in order to avoid sanctions or to receive approval, etc.), or with a cooperative attitude (understanding and sharing the functions of the norm, the long term results intended by the “legislator”).

An important type of G-A is *goal-adhesion* or *compliance*: this occurs when y adopts x’s goal under an explicit or implicit request of x (Castelfranchi & Parisi, 1980).

Speech acts are usually based on adhesion: they search for adhesion.

In fact in speech acts the speaker informs the listener about his intention of influencing her as a means for inducing her to adopt his goal (Grice, 1957).

The Goal-Adoption based analysis of speech acts fits particularly well with Directive speech acts (Searle, 1969) like commands. It is less intuitive with acts of information (where the act required to the addressee is that of deciding to believe something), and is frankly problematic in other cases like advice giving. In fact, in advice the speaker does not want the addressee does what he suggests because of his willingness and in order to comply with his desire, but because of her own interest.

However, we will maintain this simplified framework (in which, in general, speech acts are aimed at goal-adoption by compliance) because it is sufficient for our argument, and because, as we said, we will challenge it under another perspective.

Suppose that x has the goal that y immediately goes out of the room. He has many possible strategies, based or not on communication. He might for example set fire to the room so that y will run out. He might also use language, crying: “fire!!”, or just insulting and offending y so that she will leave the room.

In any case, x succeeds in influencing y: he obtains that y has the goal of leaving the room, but not through goal-adoption. In fact, even if y understands x’s goal that she abandons the room (like in the “fire!!” example, and perhaps also in the case of insult) she will not have the goal of leaving the room *because* this is the goal of x, that is, in order to satisfy that goal (Castelfranchi, 1992).

A true prescriptive act like “Go away!” (commands, orders, requests, etc.) is something different: it is aimed at goal-adoption or better adhesion: x wants y does what he wants *because he said so and this is his goal*.

### **3. Planning motives for Goal-Adoption: the example of acknowledgement of rights**

In this framework, it seems that the speaker is planning about the addressee’s mental attitudes just as a means for determining her behaviour, which is the real goal: x wants y to adopt his request just because x wants y to do a given action. But this is not always true. Humans are sometimes surprising. Frequently, the mental

attitude *x* tries to induce in *y* is important *per se* not only to determine *y*'s action. *X* is not interested only in *y*'s external behaviour but also in *y*'s attitudes and reasons in performing her behaviour.

The most clear case is in the psychology of interpersonal rights, rights that are not necessarily established by some law and imposed by some authority.

Consider the mental attitudes of two agents when one is claiming a right, and the other is acknowledging it. Suppose that, on a bus, I want you to give me your seat because I think (and I want you to acknowledge) that this is my right (suppose I am a pregnant woman, an old man, etc.); and suppose that there is no official norm or rule about this. My goal is that you leave your seat, but this is not sufficient. For example, if, for independent reasons (the bus arrived at your bus stop), you leave, your seat is free but my right has not been acknowledged. What is necessary here is G-A: you have to know and adopt my goal. But even this is not sufficient: I pretend much more from your mind: *I want you to adopt my goal with a specific mental attitude and for specific reasons* (higher-goals, motivations).

You might leave your seat just for pity: this is not “acknowledging my right”; you might do it out of love, sympathy, courtship: but this is not “acknowledging my right” either. You could do it out of fear or interest, because I’m very strong and I’m threatening you, or because I offered you 2 dollars: again, this is not “acknowledging my right”.

Summing up, I don’t want you to adopt my goal only. I want you to do this because you believe (agree) that this is my right, that my request/expectation is correct, and *in order to* respect rights.

This is not the forum for analysing the meaning of doing something “because it is *right*, correct”. I think that “right” in this case means something like: “conform to a moral norm, to a value, to a law”. I’m interested here in *x*'s claim about *y*'s mind in doing what he needs her to do. Why should we be so interested in the mind behind the action, when seemingly what we practically need is that action?

The truth is that we don’t need only or mainly the required action. In the case of rights it is quite clear which are the very different social consequences of the different attitudes you have in adopting my goal. If you do it for pity, this means that I’m inferior and powerless. If you do it out of pity, love, sympathy, generosity, etc., I’m in debt, I have to be grateful. On the contrary, if it is my right I’m not in debt: it is you that are indebted if you do not respect/satisfy my right.

In general, different mental attitudes in compliance not only presuppose very different social relations, but make very different both the probability of the Goal Adoption, its readiness, and the future consequences for the social relations (for example in terms of credits and debts).

#### **4. Planning motives for goal-adoption in speech acts**

According to this perspective, when requiring/expecting something *x* is interested not only in *y*'s action but also in *y*'s motivation for doing, and *x* plans also these

motives. So he plans an entire plan for y, including action, goals, and higher goals (motives), i.e., y's reasons for doing the action. This view is quite close to Sycara's notion of argumentation as "planning other agents' plans" (Sycara, 1989).

Speech acts differ from one another also for this reason: *they attempt to induce different motives for goal-adoption in the addressee.*

The difference between a prayer and a command is not only pragmatic, sociological and contextual: "a prayer is used between a powerless and a powerful person", etc.; "a command requires a command position, an authority, etc., therefore it is pragmatically inappropriate that a general prays a soldier or that a soldier gives commands to a general". Searle and Vanderveken (1985) for example recognize that the participants' social relations or positions play a systematic and important role in the explanation of speech acts, but they do not formalise them. They relegate the social relation at the pragmatic level.

However, the sociological or pragmatic and non-cognitive approach describes a fact but it is unable to explain it. Which is the relation between the minds of the participants, the specific meaning of the speech act, and its appropriate context of use?

An interesting advancement is that of introducing those sociological conditions within the mental representations of the agents (Habermas, 1981), as conditions for the execution or the understanding of the speech act (Dignum & van Linder, 1997; Moulin, 1997). This allows the speaker and the hearer to reason and to negotiate about their social relation and its interpretation. However, this solution too is insufficient; it does not account for the speaker's intention about the mind of the hearer, and in particular for her motives for doing what has been requested. One should account for the intrinsic relation between the specific goal of the speech act and the behavioral-contextual consequences of this goal.

A prayer is a request of adhesion *out of* pity, or generosity: I'm planning your mental attitude (your motivation) in helping me, either opportunistically exploiting it or inducing it through the prayer itself and the rest of my behaviour.

A "please-request" ("could you please ...") is searching for courtesy-based adhesion.

A command is aimed at obedience: x wants the other to do that for no reason but because y acknowledges his authority. This is within the speech-act plan itself, and in its meaning, not in the "context" either externally or internally represented!

This aspect of commands is related to another very important and well known feature of them: no freedom is left to the addressee; the compliance (adoption) is not subject to her williness and free choice. In this respect, a really revealing message (or better *meta-message* clarifying the real performative of a previous sentence) is the following one: "*I'm not asking you, I'm commanding that!*" The intended meaning of this message is: "you are not free of complying or not (refusing, negotiating); you *must* comply".

The addressee is not permitted to refuse; is obliged to comply. Not only she is obliged to do the ordered action, but first of all she is obliged to comply with this special “request”.

In requests and compliance, there are two levels of “autonomy” (in the sense of “discretion”):

1. *y* has *the discretion of complying or not with the request* (“goal autonomy”, Castelfranchi, 1995);
2. *y* has *the discretion relative to how to bring about the delegated task* (“open delegation”, Castelfranchi & Falcone, 1997).

A low level executive order to a soldier excludes both levels of discretion: the soldier must do – without reflecting, refusing or negotiating – exactly what is prescribed. An order to a tenent frequently concerns some goal state and lets the tenent free to choose the specific plan for achieving the requested result, but not about obedience.

In conclusion, speech acts are plans for inducing in the addressee rich and specific mental attitudes and motives for adoption. They *prescribe an entire mind* rather than a given action only.

Let us call for simplicity “goal-adoption” the mere adoption of the required/expected intention and behaviour (the task) and “motivation-adoption” the adoption not only of the task/behaviour but also of the proposed motives (higher-goals) for doing/adopting that goal and behaviour.<sup>2</sup>

## 5. Conflicts about motives

Let us examine the conflict between the reasons and motives for the adoption as planned and expected by the speaker and the motives for adopting offered by the addressee; a very interesting level of negotiation between them (like between norms legislators and addressees).

As we said, humans not only want goal-adoption and practical help from others, but they also consider very important the mental attitude of the helper, i.e., the motives for adopting. In fact they search and plan for a certain type of adoption based on specific motives, and they ask for a given mental attitude, not just for the required behaviour.

In fact, speech acts prescribe an entire mind rather than just a given action only. This *pretence* by the requiring agent (the speaker) produces several possible conflicts.

When one cries “Help me! help me!” while drowning in a river she neither wants nor expects that the would-be helper asks her “What will you give me?”. There is a conflict here about the motives for adoption: she is asking for a terminal altruistic adoption, while the other offers her an exchange-based adoption.

<sup>2</sup> This simplifies our discussion although it is not completely correct, since motives are just higher-goals whom the adopted goals are instrumental to: i.e., “motivation adoption” is just “goal adoption” at an higher level of the plan.

When, after a sexual intercourse, your partner asks you for some money, or vice versa when your partner puts some money on the table, there may be a terrible disappointment due to a misunderstanding and a conflict about motives for adoption. In the latter scenario, for example, the other was searching for a commercial adoption of his sexual desires, without affective or other “complications”, while you were adopting the other’s goals for different reasons (attraction, sympathy, love, etc.).

This kind of conflicts are relevant not only at the interpersonal level, but also in organisations, and even among future artificial intelligent agents. In fact, *also among these agents there might be several reasons for adopting* each other, in particular in open environments (like the web) and in MASs with heterogeneous, self-interested agents. One should at least distinguish between “free” and “due” goal-adoption and commitment.

### 5.1. DUE ADOPTIONS: DEBTS AND ROLES

**Debts.** First of all, it is very reasonable that in several MA systems (like in systems for supporting cooperative work) the agents should have a memory of previous interactions, and in particular maintain both a memory of the reliability and honesty of the other agents (their “reputation”), and a book/record of their *credits* (I did something for him, I’m waiting for some reciprocation) and *debts* (she did something for me, she is waiting for some reciprocation). Of course, this would also require a “social norm” (an obligation) or a built-in goal of reciprocation in the agents.

Now, suppose agents which have such a debts-credits information; they are liable to a *specific form of delegation conflict* (Castelfranchi & Falcone, 1997): agent x asks y to do action *a* for reciprocation, while y is ready to help x but not as reciprocation. Suppose y believes that she has no debts with x and intends to help x for exchange (asking for some immediate reward or for some future reciprocation) or for sympathy, benevolence, etc. Conflict and negotiation are not about doing/helping/adopting or not, or about the amount of reward: they are about the motives for adopting. X delegates/asks *a* to y provided that y adopts his goal for specific motivation (duty), while y adopts x’s task/request, provided that x accepts her motives (not a “due” adoption but a free one). Conflict and negotiation are not about goal-adoption but about motivation-adoption.

**Duties (role).** Second, suppose an organisation, i.e., a collective activity of a group of agents based on some previous commitment among them relative not just to a specific and extemporaneous task, but to a class of possible tasks (Castelfranchi, 1995). These commitments about classes of goals within the organisation plans, define the Role of each agent in that organisation.

The existence of such an established Role, generic commitments, and pre-agreement, deeply changes the relation between the “client” and the “contractor”. In fact, if x asks y to do something (*a*) that belongs to her Role, this is just an

instantiation of what y already promised/agreed to do: it is her Role-duty. Y has to do this “by Role”, by contract.

Also this source of duty rises possible conflicts of delegation.

Y might disagree about *a* belonging to her office or *x* belonging to the Role addressee (client), etc.; and this disagreement might be the basis for a conflict also about motives for adopting: *x* might search for a due, role-based adoption, while *y* is ready to help *x* but for other reasons. For example *x* gives a “command” to *y*, while *y* does not want to “obey” but just to friendly help or to exchange.

**Free adoption.** Of course, also within free adoption there might be conflicts about reasons: *x* wants that *y* helps him for cooperation (since he believes that they are co-interested in a common goal) while *y* asks for some reward.

## 6. What kind of mind is expected by normative prescriptions?

Norms are prescriptions (Ross, 1958; Hart, 1961; Conte & Castelfranchi, 1993). Both laws and social norms are aimed at determining our behaviour. When expressed linguistically in a direct form they are typically imperatives.

What kind of imperative/prescription is a norm? What kind of mind does it wants the recipient to have in adhering to it? Certainly the norm is not *respected* without adoption, for instance if *y* performs the prescribed behaviour just accidentally or for independent reasons. But, is a norm fully “respected” by any kind of adoption?

Let me compare a normative prescription with a simple personal prescription. When *x* says to *y* “Go away!” he is informing *y* of his goal that *y* goes away, in order to induce *y*, through the adoption of his goal, to go away. In this situation, it is not so important to understand if the goal of the speaker is just that *y* goes away by goal-adoption or that *y* “obeys”. (*X* might be satisfied *even* by a mere non-adoptive offence reaction of *y*’s). Depending on different circumstances the goal of the speaker is just goal-adoption (more precisely: adhesion) or obedience.

*Obedience is more than simple adhesion*: it also implies the acknowledgement of *x*’s authority and power, and then submission and public or mutual reinforcement of the authority: I adopt the goal because I acknowledge your authority and in order to acknowledge it.<sup>3</sup> Norms are always aimed at “obedience”: they don’t ask just a given behaviour, but also that this behaviour means the acknowledgement and reinforcement of both the authority and the norm itself. Norms ask for submission.

In normal prescriptions the expressed will is a private, personal one; in normative prescriptions the will is not personal but “authoritative”.

<sup>3</sup> Why did God conceal to Adam the terrible consequences of gathering the prohibited fruit? Was him deceiving Adam? The conceilement of such relevant consequences was necessary because God was aimed at Adam’s obedience. He did not simply want Adam not to gather the fruit (for example for a rational decision based on convenience). He wanted Adam to obey and to recognise his authority, whether understanding or not the consequences or the purposes of the forbidden action.

What this precisely means is what we are trying to clarify in terms of mental attitudes; but this is only a partial account: the analysis of institutional power is also necessary (Sergot & Jones, 1995; Jones & Sergot, 1996).

In prescribing norms the “legislator”, or prescribing agent (Conte & Castelfranchi, 1995) intends that the addressee adheres to his will as an authoritative will, and not as a private one. To obey a norm as a private will and request means to deny its normative character and “force”; it means that you are not likely to obey next time (since one is free to adhere or not to a private request); it means to challenge the authority and its legitimacy.

This is why norms are interested not only in factual “obedience” but in true, cognitive “obedience”. An agent can even deliberately violate a norm, while considering and acknowledging it as such. For norms and authority survival this is probably more important than practical conformity.

In a sense there are two types and levels of norm violation:

- *Surface violation*, which is behavioural violation. This includes the case where the agent still consider the norm as a norm and the “legislator” as an entitled and acknowledged authority. He violates the norm just because he has more important or compelling motives.
- *Deep violation*, in which the agent (even doing what is required to do, even behaviourally conforming to the norm) does not consider the norm as a norm, and does not recognise the authority; if he obeys, he does it just for interest or fear. Perhaps he is even contesting the authority and being ready to a revolution.

More precisely, one might distinguish between four cases:

		<b>Behavioural conformity</b>	
		<b>YES</b>	<b>NO</b>
<b>A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t</b>	<b>YES</b>	<b>Real Conformity</b>	<b>Hidden Conformity/ Surface Violation</b>
	<b>NO</b>	<b>Hidden Violation/ Surface Conformity</b>	<b>Rebellion</b>

So, above all, *norms (not only moral but also legal norms) prescribe minds, mental attitudes.*

Of course, actually a norm can be respected also out of personal interest, to obtain rewards, or avoid punishment (sanctions). And in fact many norms specify sanctions. But this is in some sense a sub-ideal case (Jones & Pörn, 1985). Ideally, a

*norm is obeyed because it is a norm* (both whether or not y understands and agrees with its intended social effects). And ideally a norm prescribes that it be obeyed just because it is a norm. Other forms of adhesion (that are not true “obedience”) are only prescribed sub-ideally: the statement that “in case you do not comply, you will punished” is aimed at inducing some sub-ideal form of adhesion.

Conte and Castelfranchi (1995) characterise several forms of norm-adoption and several possible kinds of normative agent. They notice that there seems to be a correspondence between the process from a belief about an ordinary request to the decision of accepting such a request (*goal-adoption*) and the process from a normative belief (a belief about the existence of a norm concerning us) to a normative goal (*norm-adoption*).

	Goal-Adoption	Norm-Adoption
1. Conditional Action	Slavish	Automatic
2. Instrumental Adoption via (GGR)	Self-interested	Utilitarian
3. Cooperative Adoption via (GGR)	Co-interested	Value-driven
4. Terminal Adoption	Benevolent	Kantian

In **situation 1.** (*conditional action*), we find some sort of production rule: in goal-adoption (G-A), any time a request is received by a system endowed with such a rule, a goal that a be done is triggered. Analogously, in norm-adoption (N-A), any time a norm-belief is formed a norm-goal is triggered. Now, this is a rather cheap solution: agents are granted *neither* reasoning nor *autonomy*. It is simple machinery that could help cut short some practical reasoning, or avoid collisions and improve coordination, but is insufficient as far as the modelling of normative reasoning is concerned.

In **situation 2.** (*instrumental adoption*), agents are granted *greater autonomy*: adoption is subject to restrictions. In G-A, on the basis of this rule, y will *self-interestedly* adopt only those of x’s goals which y believes to be a sufficient condition for y to achieve some of his. Typically, but not exclusively, this rule depicts situations of *exchange*. A *utilitarian* N-A rule says that for all norms, y will have the corresponding normative goals if he believes he can get something in return (avoid punishment, obtain approval, praise, etc.).

In **situation 3.** (*cooperative or cointerested*) goal adoption occurs whenever an agent adopts another’s goal to achieve a common goal. Norm-adoption is cooperative when it is *value-driven*, that is, when the agent autonomously shares both the end of the norm and the belief that the latter achieves that end. This type of N-A can be seen as some sort of moral cooperation since the effect of the norm is shared (in the Addressee’s beliefs) by the Addressee and the normative source.

The last situation, **situation 4.**, is *terminal adoption*. This is not a rule, but a *meta-goal* which is defined, in the case of G-A, as *benevolent* (y is benevolent with regard to x when she wants the whole set of x's goals to be achieved), and, in the case of N-A, "*Kantian*" (y wants to observe the whole set of norms addressing him as ends in themselves).

In situation 1, the rule is a typical production rule. Its output is an *action*. In situations 2 and 3, the rules output some specific *goals*. In situations 4, a meta-goal is described. In all situations, as far as N-A is concerned, the agent is endowed with a new type of goal, namely *normative*.

On the basis of our previous analysis we can argue that only in the last class we have fully and ideally normative forms of norm-adoption. Only the forms based on *obedience* to the norm as a norm or on *obedience* to the authority as authority (which are both included in class 4.) actually correspond to the ideal influencing strategy pursued by the legislator.

There may be conflicts about the acceptance or not of a prescription "as a norm". This is a conflict about the mental attitude of the addressee, about the motives she should have in complying with the norm. It is just a special case of social conflicts about motives for adhering (section 4).

## 7. Norms are aimed at changing the agent's goals

Pörn (1989) distinguishes two basic forms of *influence*:

- (a) the *effective action* (ExEyp): x brings it about that y brings it about that p (*John gets Mary to work on her paper*)
- (b) *letting* (FxEyp): x lets y bring it about that p (*John lets Mary work on her paper*)

Conte and Castelfranchi (1995b) remark that there is a significant difference between the two forms as for their influencing effect.

Type (b) represents a very weak form of influencing; a stronger notion of *influence* (cf. Conte & Castelfranchi, 1995) should imply changing the behaviour and then (or at least) the goals of an agent. While Pörn's (a)-influence requires that the current goal (and also the intention) of y's be modified, since to induce an intentional agent to do a given action one should give him/her a new intention, (b)-influence does not require this.

Conte and Castelfranchi claim that norms, that are influencing devices and prescriptions, necessarily require that the goals of the agents subject to them be modified.

This argument requires some more development.

First, one could object that norms (both social, moral, and legal) are not only commands or prohibitions, but also permissions, and it is not obvious at all that permissions do not pertain to the (b)-influence type. In fact they presuppose a goal of y that is just accepted and allowed by the norm.

Second, also in the case of prescriptive norms the required behaviour can be already a goal of *y*. While normally personal imperatives (prescriptions and prohibition) really presuppose that the addressee is considering a different goal (otherwise they would be pragmatically inadequate), norms do not share exactly the same pragmatic conditions. In fact norms are addressed to an open class of agents and to a class of situations: they do not have such a specific addressee and context, so that the speaker/legislator can know about current goals or intentions of the addressee. What a norm presupposes is just the possibility, and perhaps the probability of *y* pursuing a forbidden goal. Nothing more. In this condition it is actually possible that *y* has no intention to do what is prohibited, or that *y* intends to do exactly what is prescribed. Thus it seems that not necessarily norms have to change *y*'s goals.

However, these possible and reasonable objections do not invalidate our thesis that norms are aimed at changing *y*'s goals.

As already argued, when a norm prescribes you *p* (ex. "Go out!") it does not just want you to do *p*: it wants you to "obey", which is much more. The norm pretends you to do what is prescribed for adoption/adhesion to the norm, or at least *also* for adhesion, obedience to a norm. Thus even if you already wanted *p*, as a personal goal of yours, you have to change your beliefs and your goals: you have to pursue *p* for new, different reasons and motives. In fact *p* is now a different goal.

Also a *normative permission*, if understood and accepted *as a permission*, changes your previous private desire or intention: now you know that your action is subjected to a norm and that you depend on some authority in order to perform your action. Then you no longer have your goal *p*, but you have your goal *p* *as permitted*, and then with the additional goal-advantage of not violating norms.

## 8. Conclusion

Starting from the analysis of speech acts in terms of beliefs, goals and plans of the agents, we argued that the representation of the hearer's mind in the speaker mind is much richer and important than supposed, and that speech acts differ from one another as for the different "minds" the speaker is attempting to obtain from the hearer.

The speaker is not only interested in the internal or external expected action but also in the attitudes and motives of the addressee in performing that action.

The social positions of the agents or their introduction into the agents' minds as conditions for the speech act, are not sufficient: different speech acts *attempt to induce different motives for goal-adoption in the addressee*.

The hearer can negotiate with the speaker precisely about the expected mental attitude, the adoption of some *motive* for doing something. Important conflicts can arise which are not relative to what to do, or the decision to do or not to do, but to the different motives requested by the speaker (and the norm "legislator") and offered by the hearer (or the norm addressee).

This view has been applied to norms and in particular to normative prescriptions, pointing out that *what is required by a norm is not only a behaviour but also a mental and social attitude*, and that the prescribed mind might be even more important than the prescribed behaviour.

Norms are always aimed at “obedience”, and “obedience” is a motivational notion. They don’t want just behavioural conformity, but also that this conformity implies an acknowledgement and a reinforcement of both the authority and the norm itself. Norms ask for submission. In normal prescriptions the expressed will is a private, personal one; in normative prescriptions the will is not personal but “authoritative” and must be complied with as such. Thus, there are surface and hidden forms of both norm violation and conformity. On the basis of this analysis of normative forms of influencing it can be concluded that any form of norm under any circumstance is in fact aimed at influencing the addressee, by changing her goals. In fact, even if one already had the prescribed action as a personal goal, one has to change one’s beliefs and goals, and perform that action for new, different reasons and motives.

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